A critical communication channel fell silent at the worst possible moment for residents of Montague, Massachusetts, as the season’s first major snowstorm descended and the town’s emergency alert system remained unresponsive. This operational paralysis was not a technical glitch but the direct result of a far-reaching cybersecurity breach that compromised its third-party provider, thrusting the small town into a larger national conversation about the digital vulnerabilities of essential public services. In the aftermath, facing a significant erosion of public trust and a system deemed fundamentally insecure, Montague officials embarked on a decisive path to sever ties with their long-time vendor and embrace a new platform, a move that highlights the complex risk calculations local governments must now make in an increasingly connected, and increasingly perilous, digital landscape.
Anatomy of a System Failure
The National Breach
The chain of events leading to Montague’s communication blackout began in November with a sophisticated cyberattack targeting OnSolve CodeRED, a widely used emergency notification platform owned by the global risk and crisis management firm Crisis24. The perpetrators were identified as INC Ransomware, a known and organized cybercriminal group notorious for its “double extortion” tactics, which involve not only encrypting a victim’s data but also exfiltrating it and threatening public release to pressure payment. In this case, the group successfully breached CodeRED’s infrastructure, gaining access to a trove of sensitive customer data. This wasn’t merely a disruptive ransomware attack; it was a targeted data theft with immediate public consequences. The criminals made good on their threats, subsequently posting the stolen information—specifically the email addresses and passwords of the towns, counties, and agencies subscribed to the service—on the dark web via the Tor Browser, a tool that provides anonymity and is often used for illicit activities, ensuring the data was widely accessible to other malicious actors. The severity and public nature of the breach forced Crisis24 into a drastic defensive posture, compelling the company to decommission the entire compromised platform to prevent further damage and begin the arduous process of rebuilding.
The decision by Crisis24 to take the CodeRED system completely offline created a ripple effect of service disruptions that impacted countless municipalities across the United States. Local governments that relied on the platform for daily and emergency communications were suddenly left without a primary tool for disseminating time-sensitive information. This included everything from weather warnings and traffic alerts to missing person reports and public health advisories. The breach exposed a critical vulnerability in the supply chain of public safety technology, where a single point of failure at a third-party vendor could simultaneously disable the emergency response capabilities of numerous, otherwise unconnected, communities. The incident served as a stark reminder of the inherent risks associated with outsourcing critical infrastructure to private companies. For many public officials, the event underscored the need for more rigorous vetting of technology partners and more robust contingency plans to ensure continuity of operations in the event of a catastrophic failure, shifting the conversation from mere convenience to a matter of fundamental data security and public trust.
The Local Impact
For the town of Montague, the national breach had immediate and tangible consequences that tested its public safety framework at a critical juncture. The system’s failure coincided with the arrival of the first significant snowstorm of the season in early December, a time when reliable communication with residents is paramount for coordinating snow removal operations and ensuring public safety. Town officials found themselves unable to access the CodeRED system to issue a crucial parking ban declaration, a standard procedure that allows public works crews to clear streets efficiently and safely. This operational gap created confusion and potential hazards, forcing the town to scramble for alternative communication methods that lacked the direct, targeted reach of the dedicated alert system. The incident was not just an inconvenience; it was a direct failure of a service procured specifically to handle such emergencies, vividly demonstrating the town’s vulnerability. The situation left officials grappling with how to manage a public safety event without one of their primary communication tools, highlighting a critical dependency that had been shattered by the distant actions of cybercriminals.
The operational breakdown during the snowstorm was compounded by a severe and rapid erosion of public confidence in the CodeRED system, a development that threatened the long-term viability of the town’s entire emergency notification strategy. Town Administrator Walter Ramsey reported a dramatic exodus of users from the platform in the immediate aftermath of the breach announcement. According to Ramsey, the town lost an alarming two-thirds of its registered users, as residents, concerned about the exposure of their personal data, proactively deleted their accounts or unsubscribed from the service. This mass departure effectively crippled the system’s utility, even if it were to be restored, as an alert system is only as effective as the number of people it can reach. The loss of public trust represented a more profound and lasting problem than the temporary technical outage. Rebuilding that trust on a platform that had been so publicly and thoroughly compromised was seen by Montague’s leadership as an insurmountable challenge, making the search for a secure and trustworthy alternative not just a preference but an absolute necessity for maintaining a functional and credible public alert program.
A Change in Strategy
Rejecting a Flawed Fix
A pivotal factor in Montague’s decision to abandon OnSolve CodeRED entirely was a deep-seated mistrust in the company’s proposed recovery and remediation plan. Following the breach, the vendor outlined a path forward that involved migrating users to a new, supposedly more secure system. However, a core requirement of this new platform was for all users, both municipal administrators and residents, to create an online account complete with a unique username and a password. This request was met with immediate and strong apprehension by Montague’s leadership. From their perspective, the company whose negligence or vulnerability had just led to a massive data breach involving user credentials was now asking for those same users to entrust it with new credentials. Executive Assistant Fern Smith articulated the town’s collective hesitation, stating that the idea of providing more sensitive personal information to a vendor that had just demonstrated a catastrophic failure in data protection “gave us a lot of pause.” The proposal was viewed not as a solution but as a tone-deaf demand that ignored the root cause of the crisis and the shaken confidence of its client base.
The vendor’s insistence on an account-based system was perceived by Montague officials as a request to “double down” on a model that had already proven to be insecure. Smith’s criticism highlighted the fundamental disconnect between the company’s recovery strategy and the town’s primary concerns. Instead of offering a solution that minimized data collection and reduced the potential attack surface, the new system appeared to replicate the very structure that had been compromised. This approach failed to acknowledge the psychological impact of the breach on residents who were now justifiably wary of handing over any personal data. For Montague, the path forward required a complete paradigm shift away from systems that centralize sensitive user information behind password-protected portals. The decision was made to sever ties completely and seek out an alternative that prioritized user privacy, minimized data collection, and offered a simpler, more secure method of engagement, thereby placing the security and trust of its citizens above any loyalty to an incumbent, and now discredited, vendor.
Embracing a Simpler, Safer System
In a decisive move to restore its emergency communication capabilities, the Montague Selectboard unanimously approved an 18-month contract with Rave Mobile Safety for $5,000. The selection of this new platform was a direct response to the specific security and usability failings of the previous system. The Rave system was chosen precisely because it offers a fundamentally different approach to user engagement that aligns with the town’s renewed focus on data minimization and security. The platform’s most lauded feature is its streamlined, low-friction registration process. Instead of requiring residents to navigate a web portal to create an account with a username and password—the very process that created the vulnerability in the CodeRED system—citizens can simply text a designated number from their mobile phones to opt-in for alerts. This method is not only more user-friendly, potentially increasing public adoption, but it is also inherently more secure. It significantly reduces the amount of personally identifiable information that is collected and stored in a centralized database, thereby shrinking the potential target for any future cyberattacks and mitigating the risk of another large-scale credential breach.
The transition to the Rave Mobile Safety platform is expected to be swift, with Town Administrator Walter Ramsey indicating the new system should be fully operational within a two-to-four-week timeframe. During this brief interim period, Montague will rely on its official town website and its social media pages to disseminate public announcements, ensuring that a channel for communication remains open, albeit a less direct one. The strategic shift was strongly endorsed by town leadership, including Selectboard Vice Chair Richard Kuklewicz, who underscored the paramount importance of having a reliable and fully operational emergency service that the public can trust. The investment in Rave represents more than just a change in software; it signifies a strategic pivot toward a more resilient and citizen-centric communication model. By choosing a system that prioritizes simplicity and security, Montague aims not only to replace a failed technology but also to actively rebuild the public trust that was fractured by the data breach, establishing a new foundation for its public safety communications.
A County Divided
A Cautious “Wait-and-See” Approach
While Montague pursued a proactive replacement strategy, other affected towns within Franklin County adopted a more measured and cautious response, revealing a lack of consensus on how to navigate the fallout from the CodeRED breach. In the neighboring town of Warwick, Town Coordinator David Young issued a public statement confirming that residents’ email addresses, mobile numbers, and CodeRED passwords had indeed been compromised in the cyberattack. His administration’s immediate focus shifted to public education and damage control. Young issued a strong and clear warning to residents about the significant dangers of password reuse, a common practice where individuals use the same password across multiple online accounts. He explained that this habit could allow hackers who obtained the CodeRED credentials to potentially gain unauthorized access to other, unrelated personal accounts, such as banking, email, or social media, escalating the potential harm far beyond the initial breach. This emphasis on public awareness reflected an approach centered on mitigating the immediate risk to individuals rather than severing ties with the vendor responsible for the exposure.
Like Montague, Warwick experienced a direct operational failure of the system during the recent snowstorm, finding itself unable to use the platform to announce a necessary school closure. This left a critical gap in their ability to communicate with parents and staff during an inclement weather event. Despite this tangible failure and the confirmed data compromise, Warwick’s stated plan diverges sharply from Montague’s. Rather than seeking an alternative provider, the town’s leadership appears content to wait for OnSolve to bring its updated and supposedly more secure CodeRED system back online. This “wait-and-see” strategy suggests a different risk calculation, one that perhaps prioritizes continuity with a familiar system or is constrained by budgetary or contractual obligations. Similarly, officials in Leverett also focused their efforts on resident awareness, releasing a statement that urged citizens to take security precautions, particularly those who had created a personal CodeRED account. Their communication conveyed a sense of frustration that the system had failed during a period when important community information needed to be shared, yet it stopped short of announcing any plans to switch providers, mirroring Warwick’s more passive stance.
A Contrasting Display of Loyalty
In stark contrast to Montague’s decisive break and Warwick’s cautious observation, the town of Gill presented a viewpoint of steadfast loyalty to the embattled provider. Town Administrator Ray Purington stated that Gill, which has been a client of CodeRED since 2017, fully intended to continue using the platform despite the nationwide breach and the service disruptions experienced by its neighbors. This decision was rooted in the town’s own localized experience, or lack thereof, with the fallout from the cyberattack. Purington reported that there had been no known instances of Gill residents being negatively impacted by the data breach. This absence of direct, reported harm within the community appeared to be a significant factor in their assessment of the situation, leading to a conclusion that the immediate threat had been adequately managed by the vendor or was not as severe as it appeared in other communities. This stance demonstrated a continued trust in the provider’s ability to rectify the security flaws and restore a safe and functional service for its clients.
Purington’s confidence in the system was further underscored by his affirmation that he planned to use the CodeRED platform for upcoming holiday-related announcements. This declaration signaled a “business as usual” approach, positioning the breach as a past incident that had been contained rather than an ongoing risk that necessitated a change in vendors. Gill’s decision highlighted a dramatically different risk-management philosophy, one that prioritized the long-standing relationship with a vendor and confidence in their recovery efforts over the pre-emptive security measures taken by Montague. The varied reactions across Franklin County—from proactive replacement to cautious waiting to continued loyalty—served as a microcosm of the difficult choices facing local governments everywhere. The incident revealed that in the wake of a major third-party cybersecurity failure, the path forward was far from uniform, shaped by unique local experiences, differing levels of risk tolerance, and the complex challenge of restoring public trust in critical digital infrastructure.
